	J6RAHERAps	07700713 Tage 1 01 30 1
1 2	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORKx	
3	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	
4	v.	(S2) 15-cr-379 (PKC)
5	JUAN ANTONIO HERNANDEZ ALVARADO,	
6	Defendant.	Oral Argument
7	x	
8		New York, N.Y. June 27, 2019 2:15 p.m.
10		•
11	Before:	
12	HON. P. KEVIN CASTEL	
13		District Judge
14	APPEARANCES	
15	GEOFFREY S. BERMAN	
16	United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York	
17	BY: EMIL J. BOVE III, ESQ. MATTHEW J. LAROCHE, ESQ.	
18	JASON RICHMAN, ESQ. Assistant United States Attorneys	3
19	THE MALONE LAW FIRM, P.A.	
20	Attorneys for Defendant BY: OMAR MALONE, ESQ.	
21	-and- LEWIS TEIN, P.L.	
22	Attorneys for Defendant BY: MICHAEL R. TEIN, ESQ.	
23	Also Present: Erika de los Rios	
24	Francisco Olivera Humberto Garcia Spanish Interpreters	
25	Shauren incerbrecers	

(Case called)

THE CLERK: For the government?

MR. BOVE: Good afternoon, your Honor. Emil Bove, Matt Laroche, and Jason Richman for the government.

THE COURT: Good afternoon to you all.

And for the defendant.

MR. MALONE: Good afternoon, Judge. Omar Malone and Michael Tein on behalf of Juan Antonio Hernandez Alvarado.

THE COURT: All right. Good to see you, Mr. Tein, Mr. Malone, and Mr. Hernandez.

So why don't we get right into things and begin with the declaration of Mr. Bove and the defendant's request to have access to that declaration.

MR. MALONE: Yes, Judge. As the Court is aware, we had filed a motion for a bill of particulars, and we requested, very modestly, quite honestly, thanks to my co-counsel, because I usually ask for a whole lot more. And the particulars were very focused because of the wide scope of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment, as well as some of the vagueness, quite honestly, as relates to who Mr. Hernandez was alleged to have conspired with.

And so we filed our motion. The government, we learned, filed an ex parte sealed submission to the Court.

There was no leave of court. And so we had no opportunity to at least address that issue before its submission and review by

the Court.

And so we wanted to flag that issue for the Court.

Obviously if the Court is comfortable the way that was handled, we would accede to the wishes of the Court. But as a practical matter, leave of court is usually sought, thereby giving the opponent an opportunity to at least be heard on the subject matter.

THE COURT: Well, I have your papers, and you're welcome to say anything else you want to say. So the fact that it was submitted ex parte and sealed can be undone, obviously.

MR. MALONE: Sure.

THE COURT: And I certainly haven't ruled yet on the bill of particulars matter. So therefore, if there is anything you want to tell me, recognizing that you haven't seen the content of the affidavit, why, that's perfectly fine.

I know. It's tough.

MR. MALONE: It's very difficult, Judge, to tell you what I don't know. I can tell you what I do know, and that is that we haven't had an opportunity to be heard on that subject matter.

THE COURT: Well, you do now.

MR. MALONE: I can't tell you any more than what we've put in our papers because of our position of, sort of a lack of direct knowledge as to the content.

If the Court wants to go through the bill of

particulars, I'm happy to do that.

THE COURT: Let me first go through the situation with the affidavit. I'm not a big fan of ex parte applications under seal in criminal cases, or in any case for that matter. But I've carefully reviewed the Emil Bove declaration of May 28, 2019. And it explains, I'll tell you right now, that it is nine pages in length, it has 29 numbered paragraphs to it, and it is detailed in explaining the specific concerns that it has with specific disclosures of one or more individuals, the identity of one or more individuals, and the factual basis for the government's concern as to premature disclosure. Is that a fair summary, Mr. Bove?

MR. BOVE: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. And based on that and the provisions of Rule 16(d), I conclude that there is a basis for deferring disclosure of certain information because it poses a substantial risk to the safety of others and the integrity of the forthcoming trial.

So the declaration will remain under seal.

Now you can turn to the bill of particulars issue.

And, again, I've been through your papers, but go right ahead.

What is it that you feel you do not have? You mentioned, for example, that you want the name of co-conspirators, the direct co-conspirators, the dates, locations, participations in any meetings or conversations the government will contend furthered

the conspiracy, description of how Mr. Hernandez used or carried machine guns as charged in Count Two and Three, including the type of gun, the dates, the locations, and the relationship to the drug trafficking crime, the substance of the allegedly false statements referred to in Count Four, other than that he, quote, never accepted money from drug traffickers and he never provided assistance to drug traffickers in any way, and particulars of the, I guess, the certain metadata that you're seeking as well.

Let me begin the discussion by flipping this onto the government's shoulders --

MR. MALONE: OK.

THE COURT: I saw you jump right down when I said that.

-- with regard to Count Four. Is not the defendant entitled to know what false statements formed the basis of Count Four? Why shouldn't I order you to disclose that?

MR. BOVE: They are entitled to that, Judge, and we agreed to that disclosure. On May 23, 2019, we sent the defense a letter confirming that the two statements, which are also identified in to-wit clauses in Count Four, are the statements that are the basis for the charges. I just said two statements. It's statements that your Honor just summarized.

THE COURT: And those two statements are the entirety of the basis for the charge.

MR. BOVE: Yes, your Honor. We do expect to offer evidence of additional statements made during that proffer in support of that Count. But those are the two bases for the charge, and we've confirmed that for defense counsel.

THE COURT: OK. So do we agree that that's taken care of?

MR. MALONE: I agree, or I agreed until I heard that last statement by Mr. Bove when he said, we do plan to offer additional statements in support of. And I don't know what those are.

THE COURT: But those statements cannot be the basis of a conviction of your client on Count Four.

Do you agree, Mr. Bove?

MR. BOVE: Yes, Judge. I think that the other statement that we're talking about may raise questions of admissibility. As to bill of particulars and fair notice, we've identified the two. We've also made clear that we're going to offer evidence of other statements that were made by the defendant during the proffer. Those statements have also been identified in notes that have been disclosed to the defense.

THE COURT: But the point is, I would say at trial, these statements are coming in, in support of Count Four, but I must tell you, ladies and gentlemen, that you may not find the defendant guilty of the crime charged in Count Four if you

should happen to find that these other statements were false, that he is not charged with those being false statements.

Would you object to that, Mr. Bove?

MR. BOVE: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: OK. So I think we do have that.

MR. MALONE: I agree, Judge.

THE COURT: OK.

MR. MALONE: Judge, I think you went to the easy one first probably?

THE COURT: Of course I did.

MR. MALONE: Judge, our whole goal is not to have the government disclose its mental impressions and theories of prosecution or anything like that. Our goal is to make sure our client is in a position where we have sufficient information that will allow us at trial and any post trial motions if necessary to be able to plead jeopardy, in other words, so we know, generally, you know, this is where Mr. Hernandez Alvarado is alleged to have possessed a submachine gun, this is with whom he's alleged to have possessed it, as opposed to just all this coming out in a vacuum and it's not described in the indictment. And it's not provided for in the discovery in any particular fashion. So any information that allows you us to protect the constitutional rights of Mr. Hernandez Alvarado, we would like those disclosures to the extent that the Court is comfortable,

disclosures that allow us to do that.

THE COURT: Right. And I've outlined what it is that you're asking. So you're not really asking — this is not a criticism, it's an observation — not really asking for any information; you're asking for the specific information that's included in your motion.

MR. MALONE: That's exactly right, Judge. And I'll sit down with that.

THE COURT: Yes, OK.

Anything the government wants to add to their written submissions on the bill of particulars issue?

MR. BOVE: I think I'd just like to draw a little bit of our theory of the case on the weapons counts for the benefit of counsel, sort of to supplement the record.

THE COURT: Well, it's also for my benefit. So go ahead.

MR. BOVE: Sorry, your Honor. I meant for the benefit of counsel in terms of notice.

THE COURT: I didn't mean that in any negative way, but I will stand to learn also. Go ahead.

MR. BOVE: The government's theory on the weapons charges, Counts Two and Three, is that the defendant repeatedly, throughout the course of the conspiracy, caused lower-level drug traffickers, some that were directly associated with him and some more directly associated with his

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

conspirators, who were also major drug traffickers, to provide armed security for drug shipments that transited Honduras. That happened on many, many occasions. I think the government's theory will essentially be that it happened every time hundreds of kilos of cocaine were shipped through the country that were worth millions of dollars, that that was the security that was provided and that the defendant caused, that is, aided and abetted, drug traffickers who were armed to protect those shipments.

Defendant also proposed weapons himself. Those are referred to in the motion papers or photographs, some of them, on their phone. I take counsel's point about the fact that the defendant had licenses for some of those, and I think your Honor had testimony about a little of that at the bail hearing. The fact that the weapons were licensed is from our perspective irrelevant. Our position would be that the defendant himself possessed pistols and machine guns and destructive devices to protect himself and the people around him, who were also involved in the drug trafficking. As to the rest, Judge, I think we've laid out the authority in our papers that this is a motion that's routinely denied in this district. And the reason, part of the reason that it's denied is that what they're really asking for is almost entirely, is entirely, derived from witnesses. And so to provide this information would be to prematurely disclose the government's witnesses.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

THE COURT: Yes. The number of cases in this district are many on denying bills of particulars. I've looked at the indictment and specifically with regard to Count Two, and it charges from at least in or about 2004 up to and including in or about 2016, the defendant, during and in relation to the drug trafficking crime for which he may be prosecuted, specifically Count One, he knowingly used and carried firearms in furtherance of such crime, knowingly possessed firearms, and aided and abetted the use, carrying, and possession of firearms, specifically machine guns. And then Count Three is a conspiracy count, running from 2004 to 2016. And in Calavante, which was a Judge Pauley case, the court denied particulars of the dates, times, and locations that each defendant possessed The court denied particulars of the dates and places firearms. of possession and types of firearms. And I'm not going to order it here because the defendant is on notice and, for double jeopardy purposes, knows that the government has charged the possession of firearms in connection with the drug trafficking conspiracy in Count One, knows the "on or about" dates, and that is all that's necessary.

With regard to co-conspirators, it's pretty well established -- Judge Buchwald has held and others have held,

I've held -- that an indictment need not identify all alleged co-conspirators, nor specify the nature, time, and place of every overt act the defendant or others allegedly took in

furtherance of the conspiracy. And that's true here. What the defendant is now aware of is that the government has named Victor Hugo Diaz Morales and Mario Jose Calix Hernandez as defendants, and the government has already confirmed the identity of one cooperating witnesses. And the government is not required to do more than that at this time, particularly where disclosure could undermine the integrity of the proceeding and put cooperating witnesses in jeopardy and raise a risk of witness tampering.

So having reviewed the entirety of the application for a bill of particulars, in light of not only the case law but the specificity of the indictment and also the disclosures that were made in response to the bail application by the government in laying out its case, I'm going to deny that motion.

Now let me hear about the circumstance with regard to Mr. Laroche. And I gather what the defendants are asking is, assuming Mr. Laroche is not going to be a witness, that any documents regarding debriefing redact his name so it's not before the jury that the advocate who stands before them is the person who participated in the debriefing. What is the government's position on this? I know you've said it's premature, but what's the position on the merits here?

MR. BOVE: Judge, the position on the merits, I think, is in line with the defense. It's just a little bit premature; it's hard to predict right now frankly who's going to be on the

trial team.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. BOVE: But either way, I think our intention would be to propose that Mr. Laroche's name be redacted from the proffer agreement and that Mr. Laroche not be referred to during testimony on that meeting, and I think a fair substitute would be a prosecutor from -- I'm not even sure that the prosecutor would need to be identified as being from our office. But we have an intention and a desire to keep Mr. Laroche's name out of it for the reasons that the defense has identified.

THE COURT: Let's see if you can get together with Mr. Malone on that and come to an acceptable agreement, and if you're not able to, I'll jump in.

MR. MALONE: I think we should be able to, Judge.

THE COURT: Good. All right.

Now, we have the motion to suppress. And as I understand the motion, there are basically three grounds under which the statements are sought to be suppressed. One is that, under the Sixth Amendment, once Mr. Hernandez was charged, his right to counsel attached and he was entitled to have a lawyer unless he knowingly and intelligently waived that right. Then there is the Miranda argument, the Fifth Amendment argument, that he invoked that right and therefore questioning should have stopped. And thirdly, there is the argument under the

Second Circuit's case in, I think it's Hammad, that under the disciplinary rules there's a no-contact rule that the statement should be suppressed because the agents should not have permitted questioning in the absence of Mr. Retureta. And I think those are the three grounds. Am I right, Mr. Malone, or Mr. Tein?

MR. TEIN: Tein. Thanks, your Honor. Those are three grounds, but really we're proceeding on the third ground.

THE COURT: Which is the no contact?

MR. TEIN: Correct.

THE COURT: OK. I don't know what that means. So, in other words, it's only necessary for me to reach the no-contact and not the Fifth and Sixth Amendment ground.

MR. TEIN: It's a Fifth and Sixth Amendment analysis, but it's all subsumed under no-contact. It's a different analysis under your third point than under the first and second point. You're correct, in a normal Miranda situation where the defendant does not have counsel prior to the arrest known to the government — that's the usual Miranda situation — the defendant has to — he can invoke — and there's a question of waiver and it has to be knowing and intelligent, and we know there are cases where a defendant asks for a lawyer and then subsequently decides he wants to talk to the police, and that's a knowing and intelligent decision. We don't have to worry about that. Actually this situation is far simpler than

analyzing voluntariness or analyzing whether a defendant who originally asked for counsel, then change his mind, without some type of unconstitutional interference. Ours is much simpler. Your third point.

THE COURT: But just before we get to that, I don't know that it's simpler at all, because you're -- I'm not asking you to withdraw your Fifth or Sixth Amendment claim. And therefore they're on the table and they're live issues. So I don't understand why you say it's simpler. I guess what you mean by that is, grant me relief on any one of the three grounds and then you don't have to reach the other two.

MR. TEIN: No. I'm actually being, I think, far more -- far simpler and perhaps forthright.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. TEIN: We're not throwing all the three strands of the spaghetti against the refrigerator and see what sticks.

We're only throwing the third strand, that third point -- you didn't make this point, but the way you framed the issue, that the government -- I'm framing it -- the government knew the defendant had counsel prior to arrest and they were prohibited from -- the DOJ and the applicable state bar rules -- from interviewing him absent a waiver from the lawyer. That issue in and of itself is the only issue we're presenting as to suppression. And it is both a Fifth and Sixth Amendment issue.

And I can explain why. But we are not saying, oh, he invoked

Miranda, he waived Miranda, nothing like that. We're saying that Miranda is not the issue that Court needs to look at. The only issue — this is why I think it's actually simpler than if we were having a hearing on voluntariness — is that if the defendant indeed had counsel prior to the arrest and if the government, the AUSAs or the agents, knew that he had counsel, then the no-contact rules that we've cited prohibit him from being substantively interviewed — you know, beyond fingerprinting and biographical — prohibited him from being substantively interviewed absent a waiver from only one person, and it's not him, his lawyer. And that's what the no-contact rule says. So that's the issue, the only issue, we think, that the Court needs to decide.

THE COURT: And in deciding that issue, I have the memoranda which describe the words said by the agents and the words by Mr. Hernandez. What else do I need?

MR. TEIN: So the only thing that's missing is whether -- is the -- so the government disputes whether Mr. Retureta actually represented the defendant at the time of the arrest. We don't think that's a plausible issue. The issue is if the prosecutors instructed the agents not to interview him and they went ahead and did it anyway, that would be a violation of the disciplinary rule and the DOJ rule.

THE COURT: Well, it would be a violation perhaps of the DOJ rule, but if we're talking about nonlawyer

investigators, the no-contact rule doesn't apply to them, it applies to lawyers, and if lawyers say don't do it and they do it, it doesn't apply to the agents, I mean, listen, in terms of the application of the disciplinary rule. That's the way it is.

MR. TEIN: You're correct, in a way. Our object here is not to get someone in trouble. I want to make that very clear. We're not interested in pointing our fingers at these AUSAs or at the agents. We have zero interest in that. In fact, our papers have assumed that the AUSAs who were involved, who are very seasoned and experienced, instructed the agents, hey, you can't talk to this defendant who's just been arrested without Mr. Retureta's approval. And it appears that that theory, that indeed the AUSAs fully discharged their ethical duties — and I want to make this clear because I want to make sure that the government, the prosecutors, know this, because I'm not sure —

THE COURT: I'm more concerned that I know. You can write them a letter afterwards and tell them your deep affection and love later on.

MR. TEIN: I will.

The point is, I'm just assuming, and from the timing of the phone calls, it appears that they did just that, that they knew, as virtually everybody in the DOJ knows, when you arrest a defendant who you've already dealt with his lawyer, no

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

talking to him, no interviewing him, no interrogation, unless you call in his lawyer first and his lawyer says OK. why they made these three calls, the agents did, to Retureta. Despite that -- this is the part we can't understand -- they went ahead and interviewed him, and nothing else change during that time except the agents turned to him again and asked him after the third call, are you represented by counsel now, which turned out to be the identical question they asked him 20 minutes earlier that triggered the calls, although the agents didn't have to ask that because they knew he was represented by Ms. Retureta, as did the AUSAs. And so that may be the point that's missing. If indeed the AUSAs, as we think did happen --I'm quessing but I'm fully giving them the benefit of the doubt -- if indeed the AUSAs gave this instruction to the agents and the agents didn't follow it, the statement has to be suppressed, because, under the disciplinary rule and the DOJ rules, very clear that the agents are arms of the AUSAs.

THE COURT: All right. We're going to talk more about this. I'm not at this moment ready to rule. But I first want to get down what my record is here. And so I have the text of the exchanges or the description of the exchanges that are set forth either in the video or in the memoranda prepared by the agents, Papadopoulos and Gonzalez, of their conversations. So I have that. And then you would ask me to assume for the purposes of this motion that the assistants had told them not

to speak to Hernandez if he was represented by counsel. Is that correct?

MR. TEIN: I'm not asking you to assume that, because -- I really would -- it would be much easier if we could just know the truth. Either they did instruct them or they didn't. If they didn't, it's very easy, it's over. If they did instruct them and the agents disobeyed the instruction, there must be a reason.

THE COURT: All right. Well, let me in the first instance -- not in the first instance, we're well beyond the first instance -- in the second instance, let me hear from the government on this point. At this stage of the game, I'm trying to figure out what my record is and what record I need in order to fairly decide this issue. So that's the purpose of my inquiry at this stage of the game.

MR. BOVE: Your Honor, the government's position is that the motion can be resolved and should be denied based on the record that is in front of you, and that record right now consists of, as you said, the defendant's translation of the recorded version of the post-arrest statement, that's attached to their opening motion; Exhibit A to my publicly filed declaration, which is the report that sets forth Special Agent Gonzalez's handling of the prerecorded part of the meeting; Exhibit B to my publicly filed declaration, which is the phone records; and then there are e-mails also attached to that

declaration from Mr. Retureta, one to Special Agent Gonzalez on the day after the interview praising his professionalism and one later in the day that we think speaks for itself and indicates that Mr. Retureta was concerned about the fact that he wasn't retained and that new lawyers were going to come in to try to get this representation.

There is one other aspect of the record that I want to speak to that is before the Court but I just want to make this clear. In the defendant's reply, there was a reference to the fact that Mr. Retureta, when he appeared in the Southern District of Florida for the Rule 5 presentment on the Monday after the arrest, entered a temporary notice of appearance. We think that's very significant and probative of the fact that there was not a representational relationship. The 5(c)(3) documents are part of the record.

THE COURT: This is something that happened after the fact.

MR. BOVE: It is, Judge, but we think --

THE COURT: I'm just trying to get the facts down.

So, in other words, how many days later was it?

MR. BOVE: It was the Monday after, which I believe was the 20th.

THE COURT: Let me get back to something here. I understand maybe the arguments; if the assumption is that the assistants -- well, I don't know what the assistants said. I

quess what -- Mr. "TEEN," is it? How do you --

MR. TEIN: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: What Mr. Tein says is really twofold, that the assistant United States attorneys had actual knowledge and are of the position that Mr. Retureta did in fact at that moment in time represent Mr. Hernandez — that's one — and, number two, because they had actual knowledge of this, told the agents not to speak to him. Is that what you're asking me to assume, Mr. Tein?

MR. TEIN: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: That of course has implications for the Sixth Amendment claim as well, I suppose. So can you represent that the lawyers for the government had actual knowledge that, at the time of this interview, Mr. Hernandez was in fact represented by Retureta?

MR. BOVE: No, your Honor. Mr. Laroche and I, the lawyers in questions -- we're officers of this Court -- I think we've been clear in motion papers and I'll be clear now on the record, that we did not have actual knowledge. And I can go further in terms of the strategy and approach to this interview if the Court would like.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. BOVE: Going into this we're sensitive to the issues that are raised by counsel, the no-contacts rule, the rule of the Sixth Amendment here, and *Miranda* as well. So

there were discussions prior to the arrest operation about how to handle that. Those discussions were based on the fact that we had not heard from Mr. Retureta for 18 months. The last time we had heard from him was this call that's referenced in the motion papers that was May 2017. There's a subsequent interaction that Mr. Retureta points to with Special Agent Fragga in October 2017. For purposes of our knowledge, the first time we heard about that was in the defendant's motion papers. We had no information about that. We had not heard from Mr. Retureta for 18 months. That was our state of mind going into the arrest. And I think there is some other evidence that corroborates that we were right about this. But our state of mind before the arrest was —

THE COURT: You knew that there was a point in time, 18 months ago, where Mr. Hernandez was in fact represented by Retureta.

MR. BOVE: I wouldn't go that far, your Honor. We knew that Mr. Retureta had called the U.S. Attorney's Office to ask about the status of the investigation. Attorneys do that frequently, in order --

THE COURT: Yes, but you don't take the call. You hang up the phone unless you believe that the person is authorized to communicate --

MR. BOVE: Well, I don't think we did much more than that, your Honor. We don't have a perfect recollection of this

call.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. BOVE: But no information was provided to Mr. Retureta. And the recording bears out that Mr. Retureta made that call — this is from the defendant's mouth on tape. He never called the defendant to tell him what was said. So our state of mind with respect to this call was: an attorney, who had represented the defendant at proffer 25 months before the arrest —

THE COURT: So let's take that. I'm just trying to figure out what my factual record is. And then after I know what my factual record is, then I want to hear from everybody about what my factual record means. So I'm not trying to mousetrap anybody here. I'm trying to get the facts down.

So 25 months ago, lawyers for the government knew, 25 months before this interview, knew, had actual knowledge, that Retureta represented Hernandez, as of that moment in time.

MR. BOVE: Right.

THE COURT: And then 17 to 18 months before the interview, there was a call from Retureta inquiring about what's going on. The call related to Mr. Hernandez. He wasn't calling about one of his other clients. He was calling about Mr. Hernandez.

MR. BOVE: Yes.

THE COURT: And then there was no instruction to the

(212) 805-0300

_

agents by the assistant United States attorneys, do not talk to Hernandez because he is represented by Retureta. You did not so instruct them because you believed that no such instruction was necessary.

MR. BOVE: That's correct. And we went a little bit further than that, because we were sensitive to this. We said, we don't think he's represented by, now, by Mr. Retureta, but we understood that this day could come to pass. So what we directed Special Agent Gonzalez to do was to put the question to defendant: are you represented. And that's borne out in the report. And that's your record on that.

THE COURT: I'm not -- I've said this, I'll say it again -- I'm not up to deciding this issue, but, Mr. Tein, is that the record that I should go on and you should base your arguments on as to why this should be suppressed?

MR. TEIN: I don't know. I have to think for a minute of the consequences of that.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. TEIN: I'd like to know exactly what was said, and I'd like to know why, after Mr. Hernandez said, I want to speak to Retureta and they called Retureta three times, they didn't leave a voicemail, didn't e-mail him, didn't call his office, you know, his office in D.C., even though they had those numbers, and then, from what we can tell from the DEA-6 and the phone records, less than 40 minutes later, the agents started

1 interviewing him substantively. There was a phone call at 2 12:18 p.m. on the day of arrest that was three minutes. 3 don't know, now that I hear this, which is different from what 4 we had thought might have happened -- we assumed they had 5 instructed them, Don't -- but now that we hear this, there's a 6 question as to at what point did the AUSAs, or did they ever, 7 give the green light to the agents to go ahead and do the interview, knowing that, really, Mr. Retureta, the lawyer, 8 9 didn't have that much time, certainly didn't have a reasonable

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

that --

THE COURT: We're getting now, no, seriously, we're getting now into the arguments on the merits. You're going to have a chance to argue the merits, as is the government. But right now I want to know whether I have a record on which I can rule. I think you've raised a point that I think I'd like to hear from the government on, which is, did the assistant United States attorneys evaluate what was said by Mr. Hernandez and what was said by the agents and make a call on whether or not the agents should proceed after learning of three phone calls to Mr. Retureta?

time, certainly 40 minutes after the call goes to voicemail

three times, immediately to voicemail, meaning his phone is

off. Why didn't they do all these other things? Why didn't

they give him a little bit more time? And then we find out

MR. BOVE:

Yes, your Honor, we did. And what happened

was, continuing to be sensitive to this, we had told Special
Agent Gonzalez to get a sense of what the defendant had said.
And this is borne out in the report that's Exhibit A. And what
was relayed to us, in substance, was that the defendant had
been ambiguous about whether or not he was represented. And so
you can see this in paragraph 6 of the report. Special Agent
Gonzalez gets off the phone with us, and he says to the
defendant, that's it, we're done here, you haven't answered the
question.

Let me come back, because I don't want to put the words in his mouth.

He gets off the phone with us, and he says to the defendant, you're going to be lodged, we're not going forward with an interview. And then the defendant reinitiates.

THE COURT: Now we're getting a little bit into the argument. But I've got the point. So if I have it, what you're telling me, or I think you're telling me but you'll have to say more explicitly, that you, in words or substance, advised the agents not to proceed at that moment in time based on what you learned from them about the three calls.

MR. BOVE: At that specific moment, yes, Judge.

THE COURT: That's what I'm trying to get. I'm not trying to mousetrap anybody.

MR. BOVE: No.

THE COURT: But that is important for me to know in

terms of what the record is. And then you've been very clear.

And then something happened immediately after that.

MR. BOVE: Which led -- I just want to be clear that at no point to the DEA do anything contrary to what we advised.

THE COURT: I understand.

Now, Mr. Laroche, you've heard a number of statements made this afternoon by Mr. Bove. Can you either supplement, correct, or confirm those statements?

MR. LAROCHE: I can confirm them, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

And if there is any further representation made which is not in conformity with your recollection, I call upon you to rise and tell me so.

MR. LAROCHE: Understood, your Honor.

Just to be clear from me, I did not know that he was represented by Mr. Retureta, and we would not have proceeded the way we did if we thought that was the case, understanding, as Mr. Bove said, this specific no-contact issue.

THE COURT: All right. What's more important at this stage is the representations as to what the facts are and the moments in which there were either red lights or yellow lights given to the agents or green lights given to the agents. And what I am hearing is that whatever it was, 23 months before the interview, there was knowledge on the part of the government that Mr. Hernandez was actually represented by Mr. Retureta,

and then 18 months before there was a phone call from

Mr. Retureta relative to Mr. Hernandez, not calling about other

matters or other clients but about Mr. Hernandez implicitly.

And there was a conversation with the agents in which the

agents were told that they may not interview Mr. Hernandez if

he is represented by Mr. Retureta and that there was a

conversation thereafter in which the agents recounted what had

transpired with regard to the three phone calls to the phone

number of Mr. Retureta, and at that point the assistant United

States attorneys said, do not proceed at this juncture. Have I

accurately summarized the facts? I'm not talking about the

consequences or what anybody thinks should happen on those

facts, but are those the facts?

MR. BOVE: With a slight change, your Honor. The point we're up to is a consultation after, it was actually before, the first two calls from Mr. Retureta, where, as a courtesy, we said that's fine, if we want to try and place those calls, but we think it makes sense to stop here. And then we would rely on paragraph 6 of Exhibit A for the rest of these facts. But what happened is, that statement was made.

THE COURT: All right. Are those the facts, Mr. Tein, that you want to base your argument on and I can proceed to hear this?

MR. TEIN: Yes, but I just have one question.

THE COURT: Sure.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MR. TEIN: We did a little chart on the front page of our reply brief, based on the information that the government had provided, very forthrightly, in their response to our And the thing that I'm not -- I just want to make sure we're all on the same page, because it is a little confusing -is that my understanding is that, after the third phone call by the agent to Mr. Retureta's cell immediately going to voicemail, that the agent had then asked him again, asked Mr. Hernandez again, the same question that he had asked at the beginning, about 40 minutes earlier: do you have a lawyer? And he said, I don't know. At that point, there was a phone call of three minutes, 12:18. And I just want to understand from the AUSAs, if your Honor will ask them, is that the phone call in which the AUSAs told the agent, no, do not interview him, the final time? And I just want to understand, was there any time -- I'm trying to understand the main -- I believe one of the AUSAs said that the DEA agents at all times followed their instructions. And so if that's the case, at what point did the AUSAs' instructions change? That's the only part I'm confused about.

THE COURT: Yes. I understand your question. I think I understand your question. So the narrative I've heard so far was, to use the colloquial, a red light, and then there was the statement made by Gonzalez to Hernandez that, quote, he was going to be processed and taken to jail without an interview,

1 close o

close quote. And Hernandez stated, quote, that he wanted to speak with agents at this moment and start cooperating. And that's the point at which Gonzalez called Retureta a third time with no answer.

And what I think Mr. Tein is asking is, was there a conversation in which the assistant United States attorney turned the red light to a green light, or did the agents operate based on their own judgment call as to what Mr. Hernandez's statement to them meant. Is that the question?

MR. TEIN: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: OK.

MR. BOVE: To use those terms, Judge, we change the red light to a green light based on the defendant having said, I want to speak to you and do not know whether I have a lawyer. Special Agent Gonzalez contacted us. Those statements were relayed to us. And we said, proceed to the interview.

THE COURT: All right. That's what Mr. Tein wanted to know. That's what I wanted to know.

MR. TEIN: There is still just one question about timing, though. According to the DEA-6 and the phone calls, I'm unclear as to when that green light happened, because — and it's important. After the third call to Retureta at 11:54, according to the DEA-6, the agent again asked him, do you have a lawyer, and he said, according to the DEA-6, that he did not know, quote/unquote.

THE COURT: And as I read that, that was after the call to Retureta a third time with no answer.

MR. TEIN: Right.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

THE COURT: And your question is, at what point in this chronology was the red light turned to a green light? Is that the question?

Right. Because according to the DEA-6 and MR. TEIN: the phone records, it appears that the very next thing that happened was a phone call of three minutes, beginning at 12:18, when the agents called the AUSAs. We don't know what was said on that call. It doesn't mention anything in the government's response or in the DEA-6. Presumably they said, OK, Retureta has not answered, the defendant said he did not know. But there's nothing in the DEA-6, prior to that phone call, indicating that it was at that point that the defendant said, I want to speak to you. In fact, it appears the opposite is true, that it was sometime around 12:20, 12:21, when the agents began fingerprinting him, sometime between the phone call and that last thing, where the defendant, according to the agents, said, I want to speak to you. So I just want to know whether, is that 12:18 call, which would have been the third call between the agents and the AUSAs that morning to early afternoon, was that the call in which the agents told the AUSAs, oh, now he said he wants to speak to us and the AUSAs said go ahead? And secondly, if that happened, what if any

precautions did the AUSAs instruct the agents to take about not eliciting privilege?

MR. BOVE: I'm still trying to confine myself to these questions of what is the record, Judge.

THE COURT: Yes. That's really what I'm going for.

And then I'm going to give both sides an opportunity to argue what the record is, once I'm satisfied that we have a record here.

Go ahead.

MR. BOVE: So the record, I think, on these issues right now, is Exhibits A and B to my declaration. Exhibit A reflects that the defendant twice indicated in substance that he wanted to proceed with an interview. The first time is in paragraph 6. And then the second time is in paragraph 7.

With respect to the question of when the so-called green light was given, I don't have a specific recollection of whether that was -- and frankly I don't have a recollection of which of these -- I don't have a recollection of which of these calls it was, whether it was -- you can see on Exhibit B there's an 11:50 call to Mr. Laroche's number that lasts two minutes. Then there's the third Mr. Retureta call, 11:54. Then's a 12:18 call with Mr. Laroche.

The only point I want to make about the record on this is, the next thing, the next relevant time stamp is paragraph 8 of the DEA report, which says that at approximately 12:20, the

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

agents transferred the defendant from the CBP space at the airport to the DEA space to actually do the substantive interview. So in terms of the record, prior to that happening, I'm comfortable saying and confident that we had authorized the DEA to put a *Miranda* waiver to the defendant.

THE COURT: And what time was that?

MR. BOVE: Before 12:20.

THE COURT: Before 12:18 or --

MR. BOVE: I'm saying before the agents left the CBP space to go --

THE COURT: C --

MR. BOVE: Sorry, Customs and Border Protection. They basically took the defendant from another agency's office to their office to do this interview. Prior to that happening, we authorized them to take that step. I can't, I just don't remember, whether it was -- which of these calls it was.

THE COURT: And that was before the video interview.

MR. BOVE: Yes, Judge.

There was another question about, did we give the agents any instructions.

THE COURT: Right, about privilege.

MR. BOVE: We gave the agents no instructions regarding privilege and no instructions about how to focus or handle the interview. We left that to them.

MR. TEIN: There is just one question. And I hear

from AUSA Bove that he may not remember correctly and it might refresh his recollection. If the DEA-6 is correct, it has a slightly different chronology. According to paragraph 6 of -- and I'm not casting any doubt on the AUSA's credibility. I understand this is confusing and everything happened quickly and there were three phone calls. I get that. But according to the agent who did this report, it says that, on paragraph 6, at this time -- is your Honor at DEA-6?

THE COURT: I'm at paragraph 6.

MR. TEIN: "At this time, Agent Gonzalez'" -- "A/GS" means "group sup.," I think -- "group supervisor Gonzalez contacted the AUSAs, who gave permission for Gonzalez to place a phone call to Retureta." That was the first phone call, I think, which was at 11:25. That was the first time that they were speaking. And that was 11:25 with the AUSAs. 11:36 was the first call to Retureta. And he says, the agent does, "We called two times with no answer." That would be the 11:36 and the 11:38 call.

Then, at 11:40, the agents called the AUSAs, but it appears to be a two-minute call, so probably it's a call that went to voicemail. And then at 11, we know that at 11:50, the AUSAs called the agents back. And I think that's a two- or three-minute call. But regardless, it was at that point, after the two times no answer, it says, "After additional consultation with Bove and Laroche," so that would have been

the 11:50 call, "Gonzalez informed Hernandez that he was going to be processed and taken to jail without an interview.

Hernandez stated that he wanted to speak with the agents at this moment and start cooperating." So Gonzalez called

Mr. Retureta again, with no answer. That's the 11:54 call.

Gonzalez then asks him, do you presently have legal representation? And he says, I don't know. At that point he provides him with his consular rights and says that if he had an attorney — then it goes into paragraph 7.

So it appears that all of that occurred prior to the 12:18 call with the AUSAs. I just, I don't know if that was the same chronology, but it appeared to be different to me.

THE COURT: So your question, if I get it, is, having reviewed paragraphs 6 and 7 of the report of investigation, does that refresh your recollection that the chronology is different from that which you represented and is in line with Mr. Tein's recitation?

MR. BOVE: No, Judge. I think the documents speak for themselves. I think at this point the record is closed. We don't have anything to supplement it with. I've described my recollection. You've given Mr. Laroche an instruction to correct me where his recollection differs. And to my mind, what I've just heard was consistent with what I said. And what I understand to be going on is some urging by Mr. Tein for me to say that it was the 12:18 call that was the green light.

2

3

4

5

6

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

24

25

And I'm being honest with the Court that I don't recall specifically what was said at 12:18. My recollection is that we authorized this before they transferred him to the office. And that's why I was careful about saying that the so-called green light was given before 12:20. THE COURT: All right. Mr. Tein, I think we have a 7 record here. Yes? MR. TEIN: Yes, your Honor. We agree. THE COURT: And Mr. Laroche, do you agree we have a record here? Or not Mr. Laroche, Mr. Bove? MR. LAROCHE: Yes, Judge. THE COURT: Mr. Bove, you agree? MR. BOVE: Yes, your Honor. THE COURT: All right. So let me hear Mr. Tein's argument based on what I now believe to be the facts. I consider the record closed and will now be delighted to hear your argument. Yes. MR. TEIN: May it please the Court, as I said in the beginning, and I think this is important, and it's important for everyone to know, we're not here casting aspersions on anyone. If there was a violation of the no-contact rule, it may well have been done in good faith. It appears from what 23 these AUSAs have both said that everything they did was in good

We're not here to pass judgment on their intention. If in fact

But that's really of no moment one way or the other.

there was a violation of the no-contact rule, then the statement should be suppressed.

And here are the questions that I have that I think, by way of argument, that I think are relevant. What was the rush? And why didn't they make what appears to be a more — why didn't they make a more concerted effort? If they really didn't believe that Retureta represented Mr. Hernandez, first of all, why call him at all? But I hear, in an abundance of caution, they called.

And then we know they called twice. The phone immediately went to voicemail. At that point, if the purpose of the call is to check, is to actually get Mr. Retureta on the phone, they had his office line in Washington, D.C. There was a secretary there. He has a law partner at that office. They have voicemail there. No voicemail was left.

They have his e-mail. When a cellphone goes immediately to voicemail, it generally means it's off for some reason. The gentleman might have been in court. If their intention was to call Retureta and see, indeed, hey,

Mr. Retureta, do you still represent him? Because there could be no other purpose for the call, other than to check that and ask whether he would give permission for the interview. Given that they call and it went right to voicemail, and they called again and it went right to voicemail, the record is clear that, within 40 minutes of their third phone call going to Retureta's

voicemail immediately, they began the interview.

So there is an inconsistency with the position that he was not represented by counsel and making these phone calls.

I'm not saying that they should be — that the statement should be suppressed because the AUSAs were being extra careful. I'm saying that the fact is that Mr. Retureta did represent him, that they then have a face—to—face meeting in Miami, an extraordinary meeting where Mr. Hernandez, the defendant, traveled from outside of the country to the United States and sat down with one of the prosecutors and two of the agents, including the special agent in charge, who was at this interview, and that this defense lawyer, Mr. Manuel Retureta, is well known to the office. They knew how to get him. And there is no doubt, it's on the record, that Mr. Retureta called one of the AUSAs about a year and a half before to check on this.

What's also clear is that the day after this all happened, there were e-mails back and forth between the U.S. Attorney's Office, one of these prosecutors, and Mr. Retureta in which the AUSA sent, by e-mail, to Mr. Retureta, the indictment, which was then under seal and could not have been sent to that person if the AUSA didn't have a good-faith belief that this man, Retureta, represented this man, Mr. Hernandez. They clearly -- these AUSAs are seasoned. They know Rule 6, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6. They would not have done

that unless he did.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

So their argument was, well, there was a hiatus. Retureta didn't believe there was a hiatus, because as soon as he found out that they had called, which turns out to be not from his voice mails because they didn't leave any, but because a relative of Mr. Hernandez found out through the other person, I guess, who was arrested, that he had been arrested, Retureta immediately e-mails, texts to the agents and to the AUSA. that starts within 50 minutes of the end of the interview, less than an hour. The interview ended at 1:53. The agents, three minutes later, called the AUSAs for 22 minutes, likely briefing them on the interview. Mr. Retureta begins e-mailing the agent and the AUSAs at 2:41. So clearly less than an hour. And that's why it wasn't reasonable. If you really want to get in -- it's the same thing that we do every day when -- we have a rule in this court and in our Southern District of Florida. It's the same in federal court all over the country. You have to confer before filing a motion. And conferring doesn't mean calling and not getting it and then hanging up, calling, hanging up. It doesn't even mean leave a voicemail, in 40 minutes file the motion. It means a good-faith effort at a conference. Most respectfully, despite what the intentions were, that was not done here.

There was no urgency -- meaning there was no urgency; the general was in custody, and there was no evanescent-

evidence issue. There was no danger to the community that was imminent or danger to the defendant or any other person. They could have waited two hours. They could have waited three hours. They could have waited a day. They had a whole weekend to interview him before his initial appearance in Miami.

This entering of the temporary appearance is of no moment. I'm sure it's the same in this district. At the defendant's initial appearance, almost every single time, the lawyer says, I'm entering a temporary appearance. It's done all the time. The important thing is not whether he said his appearance was temporary from there forward, but the point was, up until that point, he was his lawyer. Whether he's going to be his lawyer for the purpose of the next year and a half of trial, that's different. But it was very clear, Hernandez was represented by a lawyer for all the pretrial period.

The government says this was, quote, part of a naked attempt to restart a lapsed representation, unquote, part of a naked attempt to restart a lapsed representation. I think it's very clear that that is not the case. I think that the, most respectfully I submit to your Honor, that the only conclusion that one can draw from these facts is that the no-contact rule — without any question of the AUSAs' good faith, but a mistake — was violated. They knew as an objective matter that the man was represented. They had a subjective concern that he was represented. They acted both before the interview and

J6RAHERAps

after the interview as if he were represented. But the agents and the AUSAs really wanted to interview him, because his brother is the president of Honduras, who is a target of their investigation. And everyone couldn't really help themselves. And if it turned out that they were able to flip him at that moment, right after the arrest, when it is so raw and the emotions run so high, and that period, the bell curve of when you're likely to get a confession is right then, they were hoping that would happen. And the agents were certainly hoping that would happen.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Bove, I'll allow you to continue. Just give me a moment, if you want to take a moment. I want to look at a couple of things here.

(Pause)

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Bove.

MR. BOVE: Thank you, your Honor.

I think today it has been helpful so far to narrow the issues presented by this motion. And it seems that the defense has put aside and abandoned the Fifth and Sixth Amendment arguments and is focused on this no-contacts rule. I want to address and respond to some of the factual arguments that were made. But before I do that, I think there are two very straightforward bases at this point to deny this motion.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

The first is, the defense argument is that the government violated the no-contact rule, which prohibits the U.S. Attorney's Office from directing agents to interview represented parties. In order to prevail on that motion, they have to establish that the defendant was in fact represented, and that we knew that. The state of the record on that question right now is, two assistant United States attorneys saying that they lacked that knowledge and statements reflected in Special Agent Gonzalez's report by the defendant indicating he does not know if he has representation, and then recorded statements, in a document submitted by the defense, where the defendant confirms what he had said to Special Agent Gonzalez before the interview started, which is that he was not represented at the time. And I think there's a glaring omission in this record, and it's, I think, dispositive, that even after we call out this issue in our opposition, there is still no declaration from the defendant saying, yes, I was represented at the time. And so on that basis, the defense has not established that the no-contacts rule applied.

But for a second, let's assume that it did. There is an independent basis for denying this motion. That is because, since *Hammad* was decided in 1988 and there was a suppression remedy discussed in that opinion, it's rarely if ever been applied. And we cite an EDNY case from this year sort of recounting the history of that. And certainly, in order to be

1 | entitle

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

entitled to a suppression, I believe what would be necessary — and it's their burden — is to establish bad faith by us. Not by Special Agent Gonzalez. By us. And there is none of that in the record. And to the contrary, defense counsel started by saying, essentially, that they weren't arguing that there had been bad faith. And because of that, even assuming that the rule applied, this motion should be denied.

Now if I could, I'd like to get into some of the factual assertions that counsel just made. One of the questions presented was, what was the rush. First and foremost, that is an irrelevant question, because from our perspective, the interview was lawful and appropriate because the defendant had said that he was not represented. But there were valid law enforcement interests to interview this man at the time, and the agents were entitled and we were entitled to pursue that option, as long as we complied with our ethical duties in the Constitution. And they included the fact that the defendant was in a position to cooperate proactively before his arrest could become public. He said that he wanted to do that. And there's nothing untoward about the DEA taking defendant up on that, when he's the one asserting -- and this is, again, in the fixed record, in his report, in Special Agent Gonzalez's report -- that that's how he wanted to proceed.

There was a series of questions at the beginning of defense counsel's presentation. The next one was, essentially,

J6RAHERAps

why wasn't there more effort to get in touch with Mr. Retureta. We instructed Special Agent Gonzalez to try and get in touch with Mr. Retureta to honor the request that the defendant made, which is reflected in paragraph 5 of the report, to try and give him a call. That was a courtesy. It wasn't required. We weren't required to get in touch with him. Some arguments have been made about the phone number that Special Agent Gonzalez used. That phone number, Judge, is the number that the defendant had in his phone for Mr. Retureta. Nothing, nothing was required. What was done was a courtesy, and to the extent that's relevant at all, the calls to Mr. Retureta established that there was no bad faith here and therefore no suppression would be appropriate.

Another argument that's been made deals with transmission of the indictment by the U.S. Attorney's Office to Mr. Retureta on Saturday the 24th following the arrest. The indictment was not sealed at that time, Judge. We are familiar with Rule 6(e). There was an order entered by Judge Pitman dated November 21st, 2018, so two days before the arrest, that unsealed the indictment effective upon the defendant's arrest. For whatever reason, Judge, and we're not sure what it is, that order was not docketed, so if I could, I would hand a copy to counsel and to the defendant.

THE COURT: If you would.

MR. BOVE: The e-mail to Mr. Retureta transmitting the

indictment was a government employee sending a public document to a lawyer who expressed interest on behalf of a defendant. It certainly wasn't a concession on our part that Mr. Retureta represented the defendant on a Saturday after the arrest. And it was entirely consistent with our view that Mr. Retureta was simply trying to develop business. He wanted to be retained and he wanted to be involved in that case.

If Mr. Retureta had submitted a declaration in connection with the defense reply, it really doesn't do much more than authenticate the documents that the defense submitted in connection with the opening motion papers. We've set out those facts, they're in the record, about the contacts that we had. And what Mr. Retureta failed to do is explain why it is that on a Saturday after the arrest he e-mailed Special Agent Gonzalez and thanked him for his professionalism. We've made this point in our papers. It bears repeating. If the types of ethical misconduct that have been alleged in these motion papers had occurred, there is no way that that would have been Mr. Retureta's reaction.

We think the fact that he wasn't retained as of -- he wasn't representing the defendant as of November 23rd is further supported by the fact that he e-mailed us later that afternoon, around 4 p.m. -- and this is, I think, in Exhibit F. The praise of Special Agent Gonzalez's professionalism is in Exhibit E. The e-mail that I am now going to describe is

Exhibit F to my declaration, where Mr. Retureta said, I'm going to instruct the Bureau of Prisons not to allow any other defense attorneys to attempt to visit the defendant.

When we received that e-mail -- maybe it went to Mr. Laroche first and it was sent to me -- that was a pretty extraordinary position, from our perspective, to have a defense lawyer seeking to block other attorneys from meeting with the defendant. And we think it's probative of the fact that he knew there would be other attorneys interested in this representation, he didn't represent the defendant, and he wanted to take that up after he learned of the arrest.

Now, defense counsel just made some references to the fact that this temporary notice of appearance that was filed the Monday following the arrest in the Southern District of Florida in connection with Rule 5(c)(3) proceedings there, and I think defense counsel's representation was that that happens all the time because that's how this is done.

THE COURT: So what do you do with the November 23, 2:53 p.m. e-mail from Mr. Retureta to Mr. Laroche, "Hello, Matt, I understand Tony Hernandez has been arrested in Miami, please note that I continue to represent him. Please make any necessary inquiries through me, as he does not wish to speak without defense counsel present. Is he detained in Miami, or is he being transported to New York? Thank you. Manny."

MR. BOVE: What we made of that, Judge, was that

Mr. Retureta was trying to insert himself as representing the defendant. And keep in mind, what the defendant said on tape was that, I haven't spoken to this man in over a year, the last time I spoke to him --

THE COURT: What questioning of the defendant took place after that e-mail on November 23rd?

MR. BOVE: None. The interview was complete. But even -- so I think that's dispositive. But this was not to us demonstrative that he had represented him at any point, and I don't think it should be taken as evidence of that now.

Defense lawyers routinely contact us, after someone has been arrested, to try and stop lawful post-arrest interviews, and before counsel has been appointed or appeared on behalf of a defendant and been able to establish that they do in fact have that relationship, this does not, would not have set up a bar to us proceeding with the interview.

Getting back to this temporary notice of appearance, Mr. Retureta sent an e-mail to Mr. Laroche at about 4 o'clock on Saturday, the afternoon of the arrest, where, again, he says, "I'm going to take steps to bar other the attorneys."

And here's the quote, that he's trying to prevent, "Publicity will bring out attorneys hoping to secure representation of Tony." "Secure," present tense, as in, as of Saturday,

November 24th, at 4:38 p.m., Mr. Retureta still is not comfortable that he represents the defendant.

What happens on Monday is, he goes to court and he appears on behalf of the defendant. He enters a temporary notice of appearance. It's on our docket sheet, I think, at docket entry 17. And so this is an appearance just for purposes of the Rule 5(c)(3). That's probative of the fact that defendant still had not retained Mr. Retureta for all purposes.

And it is not the case that that always happens in the Southern District of Florida. I participated in a Rule 5(c)(3) presentment in October of last year in the Southern District of Florida. It was docketed down there 18-mj-03581. The case is now before Judge Rakoff at docket 18-cr-820. And in that case, defense counsel, retained defense counsel, entered a notice of appearance, for all purposes on behalf of that defendant.

So it's just not true that as a matter of course attorneys enter these limited notices of appearance. And I think the inference that the government is entitled to is that, in that situation, Mr. Retureta entered that notice of appearance consistent with the e-mail on Saturday afternoon knowing that he hadn't been retained as of that time.

And why does this matter? All getting back to the point of, at 10 a.m., on November 23rd, 2018, we do not believe Mr. Retureta represented defendant; the defendant on tape said he did not believe that Mr. Retureta represented him; and then everything that happened after that supports the conclusion

that we were right in our instincts.

That both goes to the no-contacts rule not applying at all, but also the lack of a suppression remedy for the facts here, because the entire record shows that we were reasonable about this and acted in good faith the entire time.

I'm happy to address any other questions from the Court, but I don't have anything else to add.

THE COURT: Thank you. One moment, please.

I'll give you a brief reply if you'd like.

MR. TEIN: Just two quick issues. Thank you, your Honor.

I think it's very clear we didn't abandon our Fifth and Sixth Amendment arguments. Those are embodied in the no-contact rule. We briefed that very clearly in our brief.

The only other issue that needs to be addressed that was not addressed in our brief is this newly produced order, which is also of no moment, because if there really were an issue in their mind of whether Mr. Hernandez was represented by Retureta, your Honor just heard, they don't even want to hear — they do not even want us to have access to certain evidence before trial because they have convinced — because they've taken the position, which has been accepted, that there is all this danger in the case. And so the fact that Mr. Laroche did transmit the indictment the very next day upon request of Mr. Retureta is a significant fact, we believe.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Hernandez has moved to suppress the November 23, 2018 post-arrest statements that were made. There is no question that, in October 2016, Assistant United States

Attorney Matthew Laroche and DEA Agents Papadopoulos and Fragga coordinated and conducted a proffer session with Mr. Hernandez through his lawyer, Manuel Retureta.

In May of 2017, Retureta and Laroche communicated about Hernandez, and in October 2017, Retureta communicated with DEA Agent Fragga, but there is no basis to conclude that either of the assistant United States attorneys were aware of the October 2017 communication.

On November 20, 2018, Hernandez was indicted by a grand jury, and on November 23 was arrested at Miami
International airport. After the arrest, Agents Papadopoulos and Gonzalez brought him to an office in the airport, and there was a question about, apparently, Hernandez stated that he wanted to cooperate and that, quote, he told his lawyer over a year ago that he wanted to cooperate, and he, the lawyer, told Hernandez that he would speak with the prosecutors but never notified Hernandez. Gonzalez asked if Hernandez presently had a lawyer, to which Hernandez responded, he, quote, had not spoken to Manny in over a year but would like to call him first.

There were communications between the agents and the

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

assistant United States attorneys in New York, and they initially gave a red light, a stop, to any communications. Αt some point in this chronology, Gonzalez called Retureta's cellphone twice with no answer. And after the assistants indicated to the agents that they should not proceed, Gonzalez told Hernandez that he was going to be processed and taken to jail without an interview and without being asked a question, Hernandez stated, quote, that he wanted to speak with agents at this moment and start cooperating. And Gonzalez asked Hernandez, again, the Court assumes, with input from the assistant United States attorneys, whether he presently had legal representation, and Hernandez stated that he did not Gonzalez informed Hernandez that if he had an attorney know. and wanted to consult with this attorney prior to cooperating, that he was entitled to that, and if he wanted to speak to agents and begin cooperating, that he would be advised of his rights and would need to agree to this voluntary participation in a recorded interview.

It was then that Hernandez was taken from what sounds like the Customs and Border Patrol area to a different office in the airport, and a video interview took place. One of the agents said, "I want to repeat here what you told me earlier, that you wish to proceed and make a statement and talk with us. You do not have legal representation today, now, huh? You will be talking to a lawyer in the future, but you wish to start

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

this process now." Hernandez responded, "That's right. I want to start." And the agent said, "We called Mr. Retureta several times but he did not answer, but do you still wish to go ahead?" He said, "I do." Hernandez was then read his Miranda rights and signed a written waiver of those rights. He verbally, orally confirmed that he had not been pressured or threatened and that the conversation was totally voluntary.

The agent, referring back to October 2016, said, "I know you said earlier that you came to talk to us over a year ago." Hernandez responded, "Yes, a year and a half or two ago, I don't know, something like that." The agent said, "I believe that you said something about your wishing to start this cooperation process since some time ago." Hernandez said, "Yes. What I was discussing with attorney Retureta was that I was prepared to come over here in case you all wanted to continue having some clarification or for me to continue answering questions from all of you. And at that time, while the lawyer told me, quote, let's wait, they will let us know, and then time went by, I lost touch with the lawyer, and what happened today happened." The agent inquired, "When was the last time that you spoke with the lawyer?" Hernandez said, "I think it was one year ago." The agent inquired, "One year ago?" Hernandez said, "Yes," and something else that was unintelligible. The agent then asked, "Then he is not your lawyer today until you talk to him again?" And Hernandez

responded, "Until I talk to him again. He is the one who was handling the matter first." The agent said, "Aha." Hernandez said, "But I have lost touch with him. Let's hope that he will join the process." And the agent said, "As I told you, you can add a lawyer to the process at any time." Hernandez said, "Yes."

And at the end of the interview, the agent said, "You confirmed that you didn't have a lawyer. You were thinking of calling a lawyer to consult, to look for a lawyer, but at this time you do not have a lawyer," to which Hernandez responded, "I do not."

Now, the defendant asserts that the post-arrest interviews should be suppressed because they were taken in violation of Rule of professional conduct 4.2(a), the no-contact rule, and the Fifth and Sixth Amendment. They argue that an attorney, Manuel Retureta, during the post-arrest interview, and — that Hernandez had an attorney during the interview and that the DEA agents knew that he had a lawyer based on the earlier proffer session that was October 2016 or so. And defendants assert that the statements should be suppressed.

Let me begin by addressing *United States v. Hammad*, a 1988 decision written by Circuit Judge Irving Kaufman. It was a decision that applied the Model Code of Professional Responsibility. And the court said that a court could suppress

a statement for a violation of this provision of the model code, but went on to say, We have confidence that district courts will exercise their discretion cautiously and with clear cognizance that suppression imposes a barrier between the finder of fact and the discovery of truth. That's from Hammad. Exclusion is not required in every case. And it's also been said that suppression of evidence is an extreme remedy that may impede legitimate investigatory activities.

Well, much has happened since 1988. The ABA no longer follows the model code. They have adopted the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility. The Model Rules of Professional Responsibility are in place and in force in the following number of jurisdictions, in their entirety: Zero. There's no state that has wholesale adopted them. New York adopted the model rules in 2009. And this court adopted them as a basis for professional discipline in Local Civil Rule 1.5(b)(5), quote, absent significant federal interests.

But there is an important point to be made under the rule as it is in existence in New York today. Rule 4.2(a) provides, "In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate or cause another to communicate about the subject of the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter unless the lawyer has the prior consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by law." Well, one might read that and say, well, that

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

means something like "knew" or "should have known" or "had a reasonable cause to believe, " that's what "know" means. that question is resolved in Rule 1.0(k) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which I will read. "'Knowingly,' 'known,' 'know,' or 'knows' denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person's knowledge may be inferred from circumstances." So it's quite intentional that it uses the word "know." In fact, in the definitions, under definition 1.0(r), there is a provision for "reasonable belief," or "reasonably believes," and, when used in reference to a lawyer, denotes that the lawyer believes the matter in question and that the circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable. It also provides in 1.S that "'reasonably should know,' when used in reference to a lawyer, denotes that a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the matter in question." But 4.2(a) does not speak of "reasonable belief" or "reasonably should know." It speaks of "knowing." And that denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question.

Now, this is not gamesmanship here on the part of the assistant United States attorneys. I accept as the record here that they knew, in the sense of 1.0(k), 23 months before, that Retureta represented Hernandez. It was somewhat more ambiguous, but I accept for these purposes that they knew a year and a half before, although that is disputed by the government in terms of their actual knowledge; it could be a

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

lawyer fishing around. But the government acted with caution, based on the representations made by the government here in open court, and therefore I conclude there was no violation of 4.2(a) on the record.

Now, in Edwards v. Arizona, the Supreme Court said, "When an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during a custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation, even if he has been advised of his rights. An accused having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police." That's Edwards at 451 U.S. And, here, I do not see an express unambiguous invocation of the right to counsel. Here there was a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of Miranda. There was no unambiguous invocation in a Miranda sense. And even at that, the defendant indicated that he wanted to speak with the agents. You will recall that, based on the red light from the assistant United States attorneys, he was told that he was going to be processed and taken to jail without an interview, and, without being asked a question, he stated, quote, that he wanted to speak with agents at this moment and start

cooperating.

So I find there is no basis to suppress under the no-contact rule. I find there is no basis to suppress under Miranda. And with regard to the Sixth Amendment, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which does attach at critical stages of the criminal proceeding, which includes postindictment interrogations, may be waived. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel may be waived by a defendant, so long as the relinquishment of the right is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. And the defendant may waive the right whether or not he is already represented by counsel. The decision to waive need not be itself counseled. And that's the Montejo case, Montejo v. Louisiana, 566 U.S. 778 (2009).

Montejo also says that when a defendant is read its Miranda rights, which include the right to have counsel present during interrogation, and agrees to waive those rights, that typically — and those are rights that have their source in the Fifth Amendment, as a general matter — an accused who is admonished with these warnings under Miranda has been sufficiently apprised of the nature of his Sixth Amendment rights and of the consequence of abandoning those rights, that his waiver on that basis will be considered a knowing and intelligent one.

So the Court concludes on this record that there is no basis to suppress the statements of November 23, 2018 under

Rule 4.2(a), which for the purpose of this discussion I assume applies here, the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, or the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution.

Let me inquire of the government, have I set a schedule on 3500 material, on 404(b) evidence, on further proceedings in this case?

MR. BOVE: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Is there anything further from the government?

MR. BOVE: No, your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Anything further from the defendant?

MR. MALONE: Judge, I just want to flag one issue, and it may be in accordance with the schedule previously set by the Court. The government, two days ago maybe, before we came up to New York, provided defense counsel with some expert disclosures, as well as some additional evidence of ledgers or related material, not addressing the ledgers part — I can deal with that — the expert part, which, the government purports to introduce an expert regarding drug trafficking routes, which we would have an objection to. They want to introduce testimony of an expert as relates to what's referred to as, quote, Honduras and Honduras policies. I'm not trying to argue that motion or that issue today. I haven't seen any of the relative background on that. I wanted to flag the issue so that we address it at the appropriate time before trial and it doesn't

interfere with our schedule. 1 2 THE COURT: Thank you. There is a schedule for 3 defendant's motions in limine. So you're welcome to make the motion at that time. 4 5 MR. MALONE: OK. Thank you, Judge. 6 THE COURT: All right. 7 MR. MALONE: Nothing else from the defense, your 8 Honor. 9 THE COURT: OK. I want to commend all the 10 participants in today's hearing for the very thoughtful and clear presentations in the written briefing and also in the 11 12 presentations today. It's a pleasure to have good attorneys 13 making the arguments and presenting the issues. So thank you 14 all. 15 MR. MALONE: Thank you, Judge. 16 MR. TEIN: Thank you. 17 (Adjourned) 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25